This paper examines an in…nite-horizon model of nonlinear income taxation in which the probability that the government can commit is high, but not certain. In this "loose commitment" environment, we …nd that even a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit yields substantial e¤ects on the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax system. This result holds even though separating taxation remains optimal, as in the case of full commitment. Under an empirically plausible parameterization, our numerical simulations show that high-skill individuals must be subsidized in the short run, despite the government's redistributive objective, unless the probability of commitment is higher than 98%. Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare e¤ects of changes in most of the model's parameters, and yields some counter-intuitive outcomes. For example, all individuals are worse-o¤, rather than better-o¤, in the short run when the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy increases.
Introduction
There is currently a great deal of interest in dynamic nonlinear income taxation, as exempli…ed by the "new dynamic public …nance" literature which extends the static Mirrlees [1971] model of nonlinear income taxation to a dynamic setting. 1 In the Mirrlees model, individuals are distinguished by their skill levels, which results in di¤erences in their income-earning abilities. However, the government cannot implement (the …rst-best) personalized lump-sum taxation based on skills as the Second Welfare Theorem would recommend, owing to the assumption that each individual's skill type is private information. Instead, the government can only implement (the second-best) incentivecompatible nonlinear income taxation, under which each individual is willing to reveal their skill type. In dynamic versions of the Mirrlees model, however, skill-type information revealed in period 1 could, in principle, be used by the government to implement personalized lump-sum taxation from period 2 onwards. This feature makes period 1 somewhat special in dynamic Mirrlees models. For the sake of analytical simplicity, the new dynamic public …nance literature typically assumes that the government can commit to its future tax policy. That is, the government continues to implement incentive-compatible taxation even after individuals have revealed their types.
It seems possible to make convincing arguments in favor of assuming either commitment or no-commitment. For example, one might defend the commitment assumption on the basis that real-world income tax systems are not frequently redesigned, 2 and because there are long-run bene…ts to be gained by a government that makes and keeps its promises. On the other hand, the commitment assumption has been criticized as being unrealistic, since the present government cannot easily impose binding constraints on the policies of future governments. 3 Accordingly, while most of the previous liter-ature assumes full commitment, there are some works that consider the opposite case of no-commitment. Brett and Weymark [2008a] and Farhi, et al. [2012] examine dynamic Mirrlees models in which the government may impose nonlinear taxes on both savings/capital and labor income. Despite some interesting di¤erences in their models, both papers …nd that zero taxation of savings/capital is optimal under commitment, but savings/capital should be taxed under no-commitment. These authors therefore o¤er a new argument in favor of savings/capital taxation based on the inability of the government to commit. Other models of dynamic nonlinear income taxation without commitment have been developed by Apps and Rees [2006] , Krause [2009] , and Krause [2011a, 2012] , among others. Although savings do not feature in these papers, the focus is again on comparing outcomes under full commitment versus no-commitment.
In contrast, Battaglini and Coate [2008] examine a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which individuals'high or low skill types are stochastic. Therefore, even if the government cannot commit, the advantage it obtains from acquiring skill-type information in any particular period is diminished, since an individual may change type. As a result, second-best income tax systems can be time consistent provided the correlation in types is not perfect.
Since the assumptions of commitment or no-commitment can be viewed as polar cases, we depart from the existing literature by assuming that the government can commit to not use skill-type information only with some probability. When the government cannot fully commit, however, it is well known that it may no longer be social-welfare maximizing for the government to implement (separating) nonlinear income taxation in which individuals are willing to reveal their types. 4 Instead, it may be optimal to pool the individuals-by imposing the same tax treatment on everyone-so that type information is not revealed. In order to avoid this possibility and ensure that separating taxation remains optimal as under full commitment, we postulate that the probability of commitment is su¢ ciently high; hence the term "loose commitment". 5 Speci…cally, loose commitment is modelled as a Markov switching process, whereby in each period there is some probability that the government can and cannot commit. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to examine dynamic nonlinear income taxation in a loose commitment framework. For the purpose of isolating the taxation impact of loose commitment, each agent's skill type is postulated to be time invariant, and there are no savings by individuals or by the government. Moreover, we consider the two-type version of the Mirrlees model introduced by Stiglitz [1982] , but extend it to an in…nite-horizon setting. We further assume that the utility function is additively separable between consumption and labor. These simpli…cations allow us to investigate in detail the e¤ects of loose commitment.
More speci…cally, the aim of our paper is to investigate how changes in the probability of commitment a¤ect optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation. However, the literature that examines the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxes in the static Mirrlees model has shown that analytical results can be obtained only when the utility function is quasi-linear. 6 We cannot assume quasi-linearity in our model, because the solution to the …rst-best taxation problem becomes indeterminate. 7 Moreover, our dynamic version of the Mirrlees model is signi…cantly more complicated than its static counterpart. For these reasons, we rely on numerical simulations to illustrate the impact of loose commitment.
Our main …nding is that even a small amount of uncertainty regarding whether the government can commit yields a substantial e¤ect on optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation. This result holds even though separating taxation remains optimal, as in the case of full commitment. Under an empirically plausible parameterization, our quantitative analysis shows that high-skill individuals must be subsidized in period 1, despite the government's redistributive concerns, unless the probability of commitment is greater than 98%. This is because high-skill individuals know that if they reveal within a prototypical dynamic representative-agent model, but where the government can commit only with a certain probability. 6 See, e.g., Weymark [2008b, 2011] and Simula [2010] . 7 Speci…cally, if the utility function is quasi-linear in labor (resp. consumption), then the …rst-best levels of pre-tax income (resp. consumption) cannot be uniquely determined. their type, the government will occasionally deviate from implementing (the secondbest) incentive-compatible taxation to implement (the …rst-best) personalized lump-sum taxation. Therefore, high-skill individuals require compensation in period 1 if they are to reveal their type. Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare e¤ects of changes in most of the model's parameters. For example, all individuals are worse-o¤, rather than better-o¤, in period 1 when the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy increases. This counter-intuitive result can be understood as follows. Highskill individuals are worse-o¤ in period 1 when their population rises because they are better-o¤ in the long run, which means that they require less compensation in period 1 to reveal their type. But low-skill individuals are also worse-o¤ in period 1, because each low-skill individual must pay more tax to …nance the larger total subsidy received by the increased population of high-skill individuals. The short-run welfare e¤ects of varying the high-skill type's wage, the discount rate, and the labor supply elasticity are also shown to be a¤ected-and often reversed-by loose commitment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical framework that we consider, while Section 3 analyzes the structure of optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation under loose commitment. The results of our numerical simulations are discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 contains some concluding comments and suggestions for future research.
Analytical Framework
There is a unit measure of in…nitely-lived individuals, with a proportion 2 (0; 1)
being high-skill workers and the remaining (1 ) being low-skill workers. 
Both types of individual discount the future using the discount factor = 1 1+r
, where r > 0 is the discount rate. Type i's pre-tax income in period t is given by y The government uses its taxation powers to maximize social welfare, which is assumed measurable by a utilitarian social welfare function. The government will therefore have a redistributive objective, meaning it will be seeking to tax high-skill individuals in order to subsidize low-skill individuals. However, the government cannot implement (the …rst-best) personalized lump-sum taxation in every period, as each individual's skill type is initially private information. Since the government cannot commit with certainty, individuals know that once they reveal their type, they may be subjected to …rst-best taxation. This means that some individuals, namely, high-skill individuals, have to be compensated if they are to be willing to reveal their type, and this compensation is potentially very costly from the government's perspective of maximizing social welfare. Accordingly, rather than design a "separating" tax system in period 1 in which individuals are willing to reveal their types, it may be optimal for the government to use "pooling"taxation for some period of time in which type information is not revealed. 8 In general, if agents'types are separated in period T , it is assumed that all individuals know that the government will use second-best taxation in period T + 1 with probability p, and will use …rst-best taxation in period T + 1 with probability (1 p). That is, commitment occurs with probability p, and no-commitment occurs with probability (1 p). Then, from period T + 1 onwards, the probability that the government will use second-best or …rst-best taxation follows a Markov switching process according to the following transition probabilities:
That is, if the government uses second-best (SB) taxation in period t (where t T + 1),
there is a probability of q S that it will use second-best taxation again in period t + 1, and a probability of (1 q S ) that it will switch and use …rst-best (FB) taxation in period t+1. Likewise, if the government uses …rst-best taxation in period t (where t T +1), it uses …rst-best taxation again in period t + 1 with probability q F , and it uses second-best taxation in period t + 1 with probability (1 q F ).
Our speci…cation allows full commitment and no-commitment as special cases. Under full commitment, p = 1 and q S = 1, in which case the government always uses secondbest taxation. Under no-commitment, p = 0 and q F = 1, in which case the government always uses …rst-best taxation once skill-types have been revealed. However, since we are interested in loose commitment, our analysis does not explore these polar cases.
This means that the government may switch between using second-best and …rst-best taxation across two consecutive time periods. One could justify this formulation in a number of ways. For example, the incumbent government may keep its own promise to not use skill-type information in the next period, but a newly-elected government may not feel bound by the previous government's promise. Alternatively, since low-skill individuals are better-o¤ under …rst-best taxation and high-skill individuals are bettero¤ under second-best taxation, one can imagine that a left-wing government is more likely to implement the former and a right-wing government is more likely to implement the latter. Finally, one can think of the same government remaining in power and being able to commit with a high probability, but pressure from low-skill individuals causes it to occasionally deviate and implement …rst-best taxation. Since the focus of this paper is to examine the e¤ects of relaxing the standard full-commitment assumption "a little bit", all of these possible interpretations are consistent with our main objective.
To summarize, the timing in our model is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the government knows there are 2 (0; 1) high-skill individuals and (1 ) low-skill individuals in the economy, but it does not know each individual's skill type.
2. The government uses separating taxation in some period T to obtain skill-type information, and it uses pooling taxation in periods 1 to T 1 (if T 2).
3. All individuals know that if the government uses separating taxation in period T , it will use second-best taxation in period T + 1 with probability p, and it will use …rst-best taxation in period T + 1 with probability (1 p).
4. From period T + 1 onwards, the probability that the government uses second-best or …rst-best taxation in each period follows a Markov switching process according to the transition probabilities in equations (2.3) and (2.4).
Optimal Taxation under Loose Commitment
Our analysis begins by describing …rst-best and second-best taxation, which the government may use after the types have been separated. We then describe the nature of taxation up to the separation period.
First-Best Taxation
If the government uses …rst-best taxation in period t, it can be described as choosing tax treatments hc t L ; y t L i and hc t H ; y t H i for the low-skill and high-skill individuals, respectively, to maximize:
where equation (3.1) is the utilitarian social welfare function, and equation (3.2) is the government's budget constraint. 9 As the government knows each individual's type and is using this information, low-skill individuals must accept hc 
subject to:
where equation (3.3) is the utilitarian social welfare function, equation (3.4) is the government's budget constraint, and equation (3.5) is the high-skill type's incentivecompatibility constraint. 10 Even though the government knows each individual's skill 9 Throughout the paper, we focus on the case often studied in the literature in which the government's revenue requirement is normalized to zero, thus the tax system is purely redistributive. If the government's revenue requirement was positive, then our main conclusion that the tax burden must fall predominantly on low-skill individuals in the short run would remain intact, although high-skill individuals would not necessarily be subsidized. Likewise, all of our results regarding the e¤ects of changes in the model's parameters would be qualitatively the same. 10 The low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint is not considered because the government type, and therefore has enough information to implement …rst-best taxation, commit- Likewise, let W t SB ( ) denote the level of social welfare under second-best taxation in period t.
3.3
Optimal Taxation in the Separating Period
Suppose the government implements separating taxation in period T . From period T +1 onwards, the "continuation utility"of a type i individual can be written as the following recursive equations:
where V t iS (resp. V t iF ) is type i's continuation utility if second-best (resp. …rst-best) taxation is used in period t (where t T + 1). For example, equation (3.6) can be interpreted as follows. If the government uses second-best taxation in period t, a type i individual obtains their second-best utility level u t iS ( ) in period t, and with probability q S they continue to obtain their second-best utility level in period t+1, but with probability (1 q S ) the government switches and they obtain their …rst-best utility level in period t + 1. That is, the continuation utility function V t+1 iF becomes active. Similarly, the continuation utility of a mimicking high-skill individual can be written as:
will use its taxation powers to redistribute from high-skill to low-skill individuals under our model parameterizations. This creates an incentive for high-skill individuals to "mimic" low-skill individuals, but not vice versa. Accordingly, the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will bind at an optimum, whereas the low-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint will be slack.
where u t M F ( ) denotes the utility a high-skill individual obtains in period t from the low-skill type's …rst-best tax treatment.
The government's behavior in the separation period can now be described as follows.
Choose tax treatments hc (1 )
subject to: 
Optimal Taxation before the Separating Period
If the government chooses to use separating taxation in period 1, then aggregate social welfare over the in…nite time horizon is equal to:
where:
F B ) denotes continuation social welfare if second-best (resp. …rst-best) taxation is used in period T + 1.
However, it may be optimal for the government to pool the individuals for T 1 periods, before using separating taxation in period T . In this case, aggregate social welfare over the in…nite time horizon is equal to:
where W t P ool ( ) denotes the level of social welfare in period t when the government uses pooling taxation. That is, the government chooses a single tax treatment hc t ; y t i for both types to maximize:
(1 )
subject to the budget constraint:
Since the budget constraint will be binding, the solution to program (3:17) (3:18) will involve c
Quantitative Analysis
As discussed earlier, it is not possible to derive our main results analytically. Accordingly, in this section we use numerical simulations to examine the e¤ects of loose commitment. and set the high-skill type's wage at w H = 1:6. The preference parameter is set to unity, so that the utility function is logarithmic in consumption, and we set = 2 as this implies a labor supply elasticity of 0.5, which is broadly consistent with empirical estimates. 12 We assume that each period is one-year in length and that the annual discount rate is 5%, which is in line with common practice. Finally, we assume that p = q S = 0:95, in order to maintain the spirit of loose commitment, i.e., the probability of commitment is high, but not certain. However, we set q F equal to the (relatively high) value of 0:25, in order to capture the idea that if the government does happen to use …rst-best taxation in period t, it is relatively more likely to use …rst-best taxation again in period t + 1. The baseline parameter values are presented in Table 1 . Figure 1 compares the level of social welfare attainable when separating taxation is used in period 1 versus the level of social welfare in autarky, 13 14 As our baseline assumption is that p = q S , changes in p also involve the same changes in q S , but for brevity we simply refer to changes in p. In Subsection 4.2 we consider the e¤ects of changing q S independently of p. separation in period 1 yields a higher level of social welfare than autarky only when p > 0:8. However, it is theoretically possible that pooling taxation may do better. only when p falls down to around 0:5. Therefore, we conclude that the government can improve upon the free-market solution when the probability of commitment is greater than 80%, and in doing so it is optimal for the government to separate the individuals in period 1. Accordingly, the remainder of our analysis is based on optimal taxation with separation occurring in the …rst period.
Benchmark Numerical Results
Next, Table 2 summarizes the optimal tax and welfare outcomes under loose commitment (using the baseline parameter values in Table 1 ) versus those under full commitment. Under loose commitment, the optimal average tax rate faced by high-skill individuals in period 1 is negative, despite the government's redistributive concerns, while correspondingly that for low-skill individuals is positive. The intuition is that high-skill individuals know that revealing their type in period 1 will result in them facing …rst-best taxation in some periods in the future. Therefore, high-skill individuals have to be compensated in the …rst period-which comes at the expense of low-skill individuals-for the unfavorable tax treatments they will sometimes face after revealing their type.
As in standard nonlinear income tax models, in period 1 high-skill individuals face a zero marginal tax rate while low-skill individuals face a positive marginal tax rate.
However, the low-skill type's marginal tax rate is higher under loose commitment than under full commitment. This is because under loose commitment high-skill individuals have a stronger incentive to mimic low-skill individuals, in order to avoid facing …rst-best taxation. This makes it harder for the government to satisfy the high-skill type's incentive-compatibility constraint. Accordingly, there is a greater need to distort the low-skill type's labor supply downwards through a positive marginal tax rate to relax the incentive-compatibility constraint.
In terms of the pattern of average tax rates, high-skill individuals are better-o¤ in period 1 under loose commitment than under full commitment, while the opposite is true for low-skill individuals. First-period social welfare is lower under loose commitment, because the government is forced to redistribute from low-skill to high-skill individuals.
In the long run, however, both types of individual are better-o¤ and social welfare is higher under full commitment. This re ‡ects the long-run bene…ts to be gained by a government that is able to commit. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of variations in p around its baseline value on the …rst-period average tax rates, while holding all other parameters at their baseline levels. It can be seen that high-skill individuals continue to face a negative average tax rate in period 1 unless it is almost certain that the government can commit, i.e., when p > 98%.
In this case, the compensation required by high-skill individuals is not so severe that they need to be subsidized. Figure 4 shows the e¤ects of varying p on the …rst-period marginal tax rates. As p increases, high-skill individuals are more willing to reveal their type, which makes it easier for the government to satisfy their incentive-compatibility constraint. Accordingly, the low-skill type's marginal tax rate can be reduced. Figure   5 shows the e¤ects of varying p on …rst-period utility levels, which simply mirror the e¤ects on …rst-period average tax rates. Figure 6 shows that the lifetime utility of both types of individual is increasing in p, albeit only slightly, which re ‡ects the long-run bene…ts of commitment.
Sensitivity Analysis
Our sensitivity analysis begins with Figure or not commitment is certain, simply because a lower discount factor is used to sum the in…nite utility streams, and utility happens to be measured along the negative real line.
Under full commitment, changes in r have no e¤ect on either type's …rst-period utility, because the exact same allocation is implemented in each period and changes in r only a¤ect the value of utility from period 2 onwards. However, under loose commitment the low-skill type's …rst-period utility is increasing in r, while that for the high-skill type is decreasing. When r increases, high-skill individuals discount the future at a greater rate, and therefore care less about the utility they obtain from period 2 onwards. Accordingly, they require less compensation in period 1 to reveal their type. 15 This results in highskill individuals being worse-o¤ in period 1 as r increases, while low-skill individuals are correspondingly made better-o¤. Figure 10 shows the e¤ects of varying the labor supply elasticity, i.e., 1= . We consider large changes in the labor supply elasticity, as micro-econometric estimates tend to yield low values, while macroeconomic estimates are signi…cantly higher. In the long run, under full and loose commitment, both types of individual are worse-o¤ as the labor supply elasticity rises, because for the parameters of our model this corresponds to an increase in the disutility of labor. The same relationship holds true in the short run for the low-skill type, but not for the high-skill type. Speci…cally, the high-skill type's …rst-period utility is increasing in 1= under loose commitment. The reason is that redistribution under …rst-best taxation becomes increasingly severe as the disutility of labor rises, which causes high-skill individuals to demand more compensation to reveal their type. Therefore, their …rst-period utility is increasing in the disutility of labor, which provides another channel through which loose commitment can reverse the shortrun welfare e¤ects of parameter changes and yield counter-intuitive outcomes.
Finally, Figures 11 and 12 show the e¤ects of varying the Markov switching probabilities, q S and q F , while again holding all other parameters (including p) at their baseline levels. Under full commitment, changes in the Markov switching probabilities do not, of course, a¤ect welfare. Under loose commitment, increases in q S and decreases in q F make both types of individual better-o¤ in the long run, which simply re ‡ect the longrun bene…ts of moving towards full commitment. In the short run, increases in q S make low-skill individuals better-o¤ and high-skill individuals worse-o¤. As …rst-best taxation is now less likely to be implemented, high-skill individuals require less compensation to reveal their type. Analogously, increases in q F make low-skill individuals worse-o¤ and high-skill individuals better-o¤ in the short run, as the latter now demand more compensation to reveal their type.
Concluding Comments
Recent interest in dynamic nonlinear income taxation has raised the question of whether the government can commit to not take advantage of skill-type information revealed in earlier periods. This paper has assumed that there is only a very small probability that the government cannot commit. In this loose commitment setting, separating taxation remains optimal, as under full commitment. But nevertheless, loose commitment has a substantial impact on optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation. Our quantitative analysis shows that even if commitment is almost certain, high-skill individuals must be subsidized in the short run. We have also shown that loose commitment reverses almost all of the short-run welfare e¤ects of changes in the model's parameters. The main message of our paper is, therefore, that even a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit has signi…cant and counter-intuitive e¤ects.
Since this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst to analyze dynamic nonlinear income taxation in a loose commitment setting, we have studied the rather simpli…ed two-type version of the Mirrlees model. In addition, we have assumed that the only link between periods is the revelation and possible use of skill-type information. However, as can be seen from our analysis, even extending this simple version of the Mirrlees model to an in…nite-horizon setting with loose commitment leads to a fairly complicated optimal tax problem. It is also su¢ cient to bring out a number of interesting and counter-intuitive results. That said, our model clearly has its limitations, and at least two potential extensions come to mind.
First, one could extend the model to a many-type setting, but we think our main conclusions would probably remain intact. What drives our results is that high-skill individuals are better-o¤ under second-best taxation, while low-skill individuals are better-o¤ under …rst-best taxation. If there are more than two types, then given the government's redistributive objective there will still be one group of individuals, the higher skilled, who are better-o¤ under second-best taxation, and another group, the lower skilled, who are better-o¤ under …rst-best taxation. The main challenge for designing optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxation therefore remains essentially a two-group problem.
Alternatively, one could stick with the two-type model, but allow individuals to possibly change type as in Battaglini and Coate [2008] . However, as these authors show, the analysis then becomes extremely complex, and it would be even more so with loose commitment.
Second, our assumption that the only link between periods is the revelation and possible use of skill-type information allows us to isolate the e¤ects of loose commitment from any other dynamic factors. An extension to a setting in which there are other dynamic links, such as public and private savings, is worth pursuing in future research. Nevertheless, this extension would make the analysis substantially more complicated, as an individual's utility would not only depend upon the government's history of use/non-use of skill-type information, it would also depend upon the history of savings by individuals and the government. As in our model, high-skill individuals would still feel the need for compensation in the short run if they are to reveal their type.
But giving the government additional instruments, such as the ability to save and/or to tax private savings, may allow it to compensate high-skill individuals in ways other than through short-run subsidization. However, it is di¢ cult to conjecture as to how introducing savings would a¤ect our results, since it would seem to depend upon the exact manner in which savings are introduced. 
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